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The Supervision of Financial Conglomerates in China in the Post




China's recent entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO)
has presented significant challenges for the Chinese government in
regulating financial conglomerates. Since the General Agreement on
Trade in Service (GATS) requires the liberalization of financial services
and market access for WTO signatory firms,2 China must open up its
financial markets within the five-year transitional period. Experts
predict that approximately $56 billion a year will be pumped into the
economies of China and its major trading partners? However, one
question remains with respect to China's financial regulatory and
supervisory system: Will it provide a safe and non-discriminatory
investment environment for foreign financial institutions? Perhaps not.
Due to the ongoing consolidation of financial institutions, the Chinese
government is expected to deregulate current restrictions that may
impede the integration of the financial service industry4 and to create
laws, such as the Financial Holding Company Act in order to promote
competition.
By the time the market opens, Chinese financial institutions must
be competitive with foreign ones. One tool in achieving this goal is to
establish a financial holding company system that enables affiliates of
the holding firms to exchange client information, cross-market one
another's products, share facilities, and, ultimately, benefit economically
and productively. Thus, laws and regulations regarding the licensing,
inspection and other supervisory affairs of financial conglomerates are
supported by domestic financial service businesses.
1 S.J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center; LL.B., National
Chengchi University, Taiwan (1997); M.B.A., National Chengchi University,
Taiwan (2000); LL.M., University of Pennsylvania (2001); LL.M. in Banking
and Financial Law, Boston University (2002).
2 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex IB, art. V,
33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
3 Tatiana Boncompagni, Eastward ho! Entry into the WTO Was Just the
Beginning, Greet a New $56 Billion Trade Marketplace, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 7,
2002.
4 For example, Article 6 of Securities Law of the People's Republic of China
("PRC") provides, "Stock firms, banks, trust finms, and insurance agencies shall
operate separately and be administrated separately"
http://www.novexcn.com/securities-law_99.html.
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Financial conglomerates have posed many supervisory problems
for regulators, including group-wide capital adequacy, double or multiple
gearing, intra-group transaction and exposure, and risk contagion.
Financially developed countries as well as relevant international
organizations have noted these issues and made substantial efforts to
address them.5  However, since the development of financial
conglomerates in the Great China Area is still in its early stages, these
supervisory issues and problems could easily be neglected. In the WTO
era, the boom of financial conglomerates is just a matter of time. Thus, it
makes sense to identify and address potential problems in advance. The
risk concentration and contagion problem occurring in a financial
conglomerate can cause adverse effects on the safety and soundness of
entities of the conglomerate and even lead to systematic risk. Thus, this
article will focus on this most important issue. Part II will discuss how
the financial service industry developed in China in the WTO era and
will review the necessity of permitting the formation of financial
conglomerates. Part III will focus on how risk concentration and
contagion problems occur and their effects. Part IV explains the types of
regulatory and supervisory tools that are provided by the United States
and other international organizations to cope with this problem and their
effectiveness. In Part V, I discuss the defects of the current system of the
supervision of financial conglomerates in China and suggest reforms to
the current supervision system to tackle the risk concentration and
contagion problem in the Great China Area in accordance with
international standards while meeting the challenges posed by the WTO
era.
H. Overview of Financial Conglomerates
A. Financial Conglomerates - Definition,
Structure, Advantages, and Disadvantages
1. Definition of Financial Conglomerates
No existing statutory laws have specifically defined "financial
conglomerates." In the United States, the term "financial conglomerate"
refers to a "financial holding company and its subsidiaries" or a "bank
5 For example, the Joint Forum of Financial Conglomerates, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors (IAIS), the International Organization of Securities Commissioners
(IOSCO), the OECD and the G-10.
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and its financial subsidiaries.'6 In Germany, on the other hand, credit
institutions themselves can engage in the business of investment funds
and securities underwriting. Financial holding companies are also a
permitted form of financial conglomerate! It its 1995 report, the
Tripartite Group of Bank, Securities and Insurance Regulators defined
"financial conglomerates" as follows:
[A]ny group of companies under common
control whose exclusive or predominant activities
consist of providing significant services in at least two
different financial sectors (banking, securities,
insurance). Such an entity is likely to combine
businesses which are subject to different schemes of
supervision and might also include financial activities
which, in many countries, are not conducted in an entity
which is subject to solo prudential supervision.9
According to this definition, a "financial conglomerate,"
includes at least the following characteristics:
(1) It relates to a group of enterprises,
(2) It is formed by different types of financial institutions,
and
(3) The difference between firms involved is often related to
the difference in their supervisory rules. 0
6 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102 §§ 103, 121, 113 Stat.
1338, 1373 (1999) (codified in 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(a), 1843(k) (2002)).
7 Gesctz fiber das Kreditwesen [German Banking Act] §1 Nr. 3(a) BGR,
available at http://www.bundesbank.de/bank/download/pdf/kwge.pdf.
8 Tripartite Group on Banking, Securities and Insurance Regulators was initiated
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 1993. Its main duty is to
address a range of issues relating to the supervision of financial conglomerates.
This duty was taken over by the Joint Forum of Financial Conglomerates, which
was established by the Basel Committee, the International Organizations of
Securities Commissioners (IOSCO) and International Association of Insurance
Supervisors (IAIS) in 1995.
9 The Tripartite Group of Bank, Securities, and Insurance Regulators, The
Supervision of Financial Conglomerates (July 1995), at 13-14.
10 L. A. A VAN DEN BERGHE & VERWEIRE, CREATING THE FUTURE WITH ALL
FINANCE AND FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES 6 (1998).
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2. The Structure of Financial Conglomerates
Three types of financial conglomerates currently exist: (1) the
"complete integration" model," (2) the "bank parent, nonbank
subsidiary" model, 12 and (3) the "financial holding company" (or
"FHC") model. Each model has its advantages and disadvantages:
a. The Complete Integration Model
Compared to other models, the complete integration model is the
most advantageous. Resources can be shared among the various
departments engaged in different businesses. This will enable managers
to produce mixed outputs at the lowest theoretical cost.14 However,
many problems belie the complete integration model, including anti-
competitive behavior, risk concentration and contagion, and conflicts of
interests. These problems are greatest under the full integration model.
Furthermore, this model cannot be supervised by a single regulator. On
the other hand, it is also difficult for several functional regulators to
supervise because it is impossible to segregate products and services.
b. The Bank Parent, Nonbank Subsidiary Model
The Bank Parent, Nonbank Subsidiary model was adopted by the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.' 5 This model has two major attributes (1)
strengthening banks by paying them fee incomes with extra dividends,
and (2) under the principle of corporate separateness, the parent bank
bears only limited liability of financial subsidiaries so that safety and
soundness can be maintained.' 6 There are three main disadvantages to
this model: (1) the profitability of the bank may be adversely affected by
the collapse of the subsidiary; (2) the bank's reputation as well as the
" The "full integration" model is also recognized as "universal bank" which
permits all financial activities be conducted within a single corporate entity. See
Richard J. Herring and Anthony M. Santomero, The Corporate Structure of
Financial Conglomerates, 4 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 4, 213, 223 (1990).
12 This model is a structure in which the banking function is conducted in the
corporate parent and non-bank functions are conducted in separately
incorporated subsidiaries of the parent bank. See id. at 225.
13 This structure requires banks to conduct non-banking activities through a
holding company. See Herring and Santomero, supra note 10, at 226.
14 KAZUHIKO KOGUcHI, FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES 25 (1993).
15 See 12 U.S.C §24a(a)(1)(2002).
16 Constance Z. Wagner, Structuring The Financial Service Conglomerates of
The Future: Does The Choice of Corporate Form to House New Financial




costs of funds may be adversely affected by the failure of any of its
subsidiaries;17 and (3) if the government safety net is extended to
financial subsidiaries, the problem of excessive risk taking caused by
moral hazard will be exacerbated.18
C. The Financial Holding Company
The financial holding company is another model permitted by
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 19 Three advantages of this model are: (1) the
legal separateness simplifies regulation and supervision of the banking
activities of the conglomerate and facilitates functional regulation of its
nonbanking activities; (2) the safety and soundness of the bank can be
isolated from the performance of the nonbank affiliates because the
holding company plays a role as a cushion between them;20 and (3) it
provides protection to the government with respect to the government's
deposit insurance funds by limiting the additional risks permitted to
insured depository institutions 21 But of all the models, the financial
holding company model is perhaps the most inefficient one. The high
costs of maintaining a holding company are likely to offset the benefits it
generates from the economy of scale and economy of scope. Also, the
holding company system makes the corporate structure of financial
conglomerates more complex, which makes it easier to avoid affiliate
transactions.
22
This article will analyze these three models from the perspective
of risk management and cost-benefit analysis and try to reach a
conclusion as to which model might best effectively manage the risk
concentration and risk contagion at the lowest costs.
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of Financial
Conglomerates
Whether or not to permit the formation of financial
conglomerates is a highly disputed issue. Financial conglomerates are
formed because financial firms may achieve synergies or economies of
scope that will make it more profitable to provide a range of services
within an integrated corporate group rather than each service through a
separately managed corporation. 23 In addition, financial conglomerates
17 Herring & Santomero, supra note 11, at 225.
18 Wagner, supra note 16, at 394.
'
9See 12 U.S.C §1843 (k)(1).
20 Herring & Santomero, supra note 11, at 25.
21 Wagner, supra note 16, at 391.
22 This issue will be addressed later in this article.
23 Herring & Santomero, supra note 11, at 6.
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may also enjoy a dynamic advantage, because conglomerates have more
scope to develop innovative new products and services in response to
changing technology and market conditions, so they may be better able
to respond to consumers' needs. However, opponents point out that by
controlling the full range of substitutes for a financial product, financial
conglomerates may be able to acquire and exercise monopoly power to
raise prices above marginal costs. Also, financial conglomerates will
have limited entry and will be able to enforce mandatory joint-product
sales.24 One point to analyze concerning this issue is whether products
provided by different financial firms are substitutable. If these products
are similar and substitutable, allowing the formation of financial
conglomerates may raise the anti-competition problem. Conversely, if
these products are distinct in nature, the monopoly concern may be
unnecessary. Views on this "substitution" issue are inconsistent.2 5 In
fact, the function and business of banks is unique. A bank's checking
account differs from a Money Market Mutual Fund (MMF), because an
MMF assumes that all depositors will want their funds simultaneously. A
bank, on the other hand, uses statistical methods, to predict what a
depositor's demand for liquidity will be with great accuracy. This ability
allows banks to invest the portion of a depositor's money not needed for
a depositor's short-term liquidity in illiquid assets that offer higher rates
of return. 26 Furthermore, the banking business differs from insurance
because the payment of insurance funds depends on the occurrence of
uncertain events. However, a bank checking account is ready for
withdrawal at any time. Therefore, the segregation between the
commercial banking market, the insurance market, and the investment
banking market exists so that monopoly will not occur, even though
financial conglomerates do have some competitive advantages.
II. How the Problems of Risk Concentration and Risk
Contagion Occur and Their Adverse Effects
A. Risk Concentration Issues
Risk concentration may occur at the group level when different
entities within the conglomerate are exposed to the same or similar risk
24 1d. at 12.
25 For views supporting "substitutable," see FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, FINANCIAL
MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 253 (3d ed. 1999). For views opposing
"substitutable," see Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and
After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 691 (2000).See Macey, supra note 25, at 701.
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factors or to apparently unrelated risk factors that may interact under
stressful circumstances.27 Because risk concentration can occur in a
financial conglomerate's assets, liabilities, or offbalance sheet items
through the execution or processing of transactions or through a
combination of exposures across these broad categories, failure to
manage it can lead to systematic risk. Thus the significant issues become
how to ensure that conglomerates have adequate risk management
process in place to manage group-wide risk concentrations, how to create
a system to monitor material risk concentration on a timely basis, and
how to control the risk concentration directly by statutory laws and
regulations. It is extremely important to set up a mechanism enabling
supervisors to deal with material risk concentration.
A few current laws and regulations do handle some of the above
issues. For example, sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act
in the United States, establish both quality and quantity restrictions on
affiliate lending.28 Similar legislation exists within the European Union. 9
The question remains whether methods provided by these laws are
perfect or whether there are still some loopholes. This question will be
answered later in this article.
B. Risk Contagion Issues
Risk contagion is probably the most significant problem
associated with the formation of a financial conglomerate. It refers to the
risk suffered by a conglomerate's individual entity and its adverse impact
on the financial stability of the entire group or on the markets in which
the constituent parts operate.30 Risk contagion can occur due to a direct
financial connection between a problematic entity and a healthy one.
Even in the absence of a direct financial connections, risk contagion can
also be reflected by reduced public confidence in the stability of
individual entities or the conglomerate as a whole because the public
tends to view financial conglomerates as a single economic unit.31
Reduced confidence in either leaves regulators a new problem to tackle.
27 Risk Concentration Principles, Joint Forum of Financial Conglomerates 2
(1999).
28 For details, see 12 U.S.C. §§ 371(c) and 371(c)(1).
29 See Council Directive of 21 December 1992 on the Monitoring and Control of
Large Exposures of Credit Institutions, 92/121/EEC Art. 3 (1)-(3) and Art. 4
(1993) O.J. (L 29).30 Supra note 8, at 18.
31 Berghe & Verweire, supra note 10, at 161. See also Koguchi, supra note 14,
at 31.
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At least three issues derive from this problem: (1) how to erect a
firewall between different entities of a financial conglomerate so as to
limit the financial connections and prevent financial difficulties
occurring in one entity from adversely affecting another; (2) how to
enhance the market discipline to encourage public disclosure for the
purpose of strengthening the public confidence; and (3) how to
determine the extent to which the official safety net needs to be extended
to address the financial problems of financial conglomerates
encompassing banking sectors.
C. The Nature of China's Financial Markets and
Regulation After China's WTO Accession
1. China's WTO Commitment Regarding
Financial Services
According to the bilateral agreement signed by the Peoples'
Republic of China ("PRC") and the U.S. in November 1999, China has
agreed to the following market changes for financial service businesses:
(1) Banking: Two years after the PRC enters the WTO, foreign
banks may conduct local currency business (i.e., deposit taking and
lending) with Chinese enterprises in specified geographical regions. In
other words, for two years after accession, foreign banks will receive
qualified national treatment within specified regions. Five years after the
accession, the PRC will lift customer and geographic restrictions, and
foreign banks will be able to conduct retail business, principally taking
deposits from, and making loans to Chinese individuals in local
currency. Foreign banks also will be able to establish branches
anywhere in the PRC.
(2) Securities underwriting: The PRC agreed to permit foreign
brokerage firms to operate in the PRC, subject to fairly tight restrictions.
Foreign firms who want to invest in Chinese securities underwriting
companies would have use joint ventures ("JV's") and the foreign stake
would be limited to thirty-three percent. The JV's would receive national
treatment in order to underwrite domestic equity offerings. In addition,
they could underwrite and trade in international equity and all corporate
and government debt issues. Even more significantly, the PRC pledged a
concomitant expansion in the permissible scope for foreign joint venture
securities companies as the scope of business activities of Chinese
securities firms grows.
(3) Fund management: The PRC agreed to permit foreign fund
managers to operate in China, also subject to fairly tight restrictions.
Foreign investment in JV fund management companies will be limited to
VOL. I11
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thirty-three percent upon the PRC's accession. Three years following
accession, the limit will rise to forty-nine percent. Thus, over time,
foreign financial firms will receive national treatment and experience an
expansion in the scope of business concomitant with Chinese firms.
(4) Insurance services: The PRC agreed to award licenses to
foreign insurance companies to do business in the PRC solely on the
basis of prudential criteria. The PRC pledged to abandon economic needs
tests (i.e., conditioning the grant of a license on the economic needs of
the locality in which the foreign firm proposes to do business) and to
eliminate quantitative restrictions on the number of licenses it issued.
With respect to FDI in specific insurance activities, the PRC agreed to
grant foreign insurers the right - effective immediately upon WTO
accession - to take up to a fifty percent equity stake in local life
insurance companies, up to a fifty-one percent stake in non-life
32
insurance companies, and up to 100 percent in re-insurance companies.
These JV's are now empowered to insure large-scale risks, and foreign
life insurance firms may pick their own JV partners. However, their
operations would be restricted to a dozen key Chinese cities, including
Shanghai and Guangzhous, that the United States has interest in relations
with during the first two-to-three years following accession. Two years
after accession, the PRC pledged it would open up twelve more cities,
including Beijing, and permit foreign non-life and re-insurance
companies to form wholly owned subsidiaries. Five years after
accession, the PRC would drop all geographic restrictions on licensing,
and permit nation-wide branching. Regarding the scope of activities, the
PRC agreed to allow foreign property and casualty firms to insure large-
scale commercial risks nation-wide immediately upon accession. During
a five-year phase-in period, the PRC promised to expand the scope of
permissible activities of foreign insurance companies to include group,
health, and pension products. Whether foreign insurers could offer group
plans to companies that are not based in the same city as the insurer and
whether these insurers could open branch offices is still unclear.
Significantly, the PRC made no commitments on market access for
foreign insurance brokers.
In this agreement, China still makes no provision for the entry of
foreign financial conglomerates because the formation of financial
conglomerates is currently prohibited in China. Put another way, the
relic of protectionism can still be seen in this agreement. Thus, in the
discussion that follows I will examine whether the extent of market
32 Non-life insurance products include health, pension, and property policies.
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liberalization needs to be raised and whether to permit the formation of
domestic and foreign financial conglomerates.
2. Arguments on the Pros and Cons of Opening
up Financial Markets in China and the
Extent of Market Open-up
Although China's inclusion in the WTO has required it to open
its financial sector to foreign competition over the next five years,
viewpoints on whether to liberalize its domestic financial service market
vary.
Advocates of opening up the market assert that despite some
competitive advantages of foreign institutions, their presence will be
beneficial as new products as well as new management and marketing
techniques will be introduced into China, accelerating its domestic
growth. Moreover, to strengthen the competitiveness of domestic
financial institutions, it is also necessary to permit the affiliation between
commercial and securities firms and/or insurance companies. Further, it
would be especially helpful to allow the joint venture between domestic
financial institutions and foreign financial institutions. Also, opening the
competition to foreign financial conglomerates may encourage reform of
the current financial regulatory and supervisory system to meet
international standards.33
On the other hand, some contend that control and monitoring of
foreign financial institutions must be enhanced because such institutions
may engage in regulatory arbitrage, unfair competition, or the poaching
of human resources from domestic financial institutions, which impedes
the development of domestic financial industries
34
Competition, including competition from international sources,
forces companies to reduce waste, improve management, and become
more efficient. High cost activities, intended to gain or maintain
preferential credit access or other privileges, are also less feasible in
liberalized environments.35 Thus, changes brought about by market
33 Li Song, Jia Ru WTO: Cong Zheng Ti Shan Jian Chuan jin jung ti S, [Entering
WTO: Completely Strengthen the Financial Regulation System], at
http://bankinfo.myetang.com (last visited Oct., 2001).
34 Fengchi Cho, In Jie WTO Hsin Tiao Zhan Yao Ja Chang Dui Wai Zi In Hang
Jian Guan [Enhancing the Control and Monitor to Foreign Banks to face the
Challenge of WTO Accession]
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/36/20011008/576330.html
(last visited Oct., 2002).
35 Opening Markets In Financial Services and the Role of GATS, World Trade
Organization (1995), at 17.
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liberalization can reduce the operational costs of providing financial
services. Competition then forces institutions to pass on cost-savings to
consumers, and the spread between lending and deposit rate decreases, as
do commissions and insurance premiums. Open and more efficient
financial markets affect savings and investment, and improve the inter-
temporal allocation of resources. Competition among financial
institutions, the liberalization of interest rates, and the emergence of new
savings instruments are likely to increase the returns to investments.
This increase stimulates aggregate savings and higher investments that,
in turn, boost growth.36 As mentioned above, after its WTO accession,
China has become the biggest capital "vacuum" in the world. However,
without market liberalization the Chinese financial industry's capability
to maximize huge capital and make it more circulative is doubtful. Thus,
protectionism not only mitigates the entry of foreign capital but it also
impedes the growth of the Chinese economy.
The most important concern of the Chinese government is
perhaps that foreign financial institutions will end up dominating the
domestic market after liberalization and will abuse this position.
However, if a government wishes to maintain a certain national presence
in the domestic market, or wishes to provide temporary support to
national suppliers, then from an efficiency perspective, these objectives
are better attained through fiscal incentive rather than through
restrictions on trade. The provision of such incentives will not be
difficult to accomplish because most Chinese commercial banks are
state-owned.
From the preceding paragraphs, it can be concluded that broadly
opening the financial market is essential for both the economic growth
and the expansion of the domestic financial service industry in China. If
market liberalization is inevitable and beneficial, then effective financial
regulations will be the key to making the open-up even more successful.
Thus, the next part of this comment will review the American financial
regulations that address risk concentration and contagion, and then
examine the current supervisory system in China.
IV. Tools Used to Supervise Risk Concentration and Risk
Contagion in the United States, and Other International
Standards
Before the promulgation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLBA) in the United States, there were no laws or regulations designed
particularly for the supervision of financial conglomerates because
36 Id. at 21.
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securities firms and insurance companies were not permitted to affiliate
with banks. However, some laws and regulations promulgated before
the GLBA - for example, Section 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve
Act and the Glass-Steagall Act - were often referred to as the "Chinese
Wall" because they prevented the risk concentration and risk contagion
problems. The GLBA grants the Federal Reserve Board the plenary
authority of "umbrella supervision," as opposed to other regulators,
including securities regulators and state insurance regulators, who are
granted their authority on the basis of the nature of the activity they
perform. Laws and regulations prior to the GLBA and regulatory
changes in GLBA will be addressed in the following paragraphs.
The Tripartite Group of Bank, Securities and Insurance
Regulators and the Joint Forum of Financial Conglomerates were formed
to address a range of issues relating to the supervision of financial
conglomerates. Their findings have been published in many reports.
Although guidelines provided in these reports are unenforceable by
regulators, the guidelines, like the work of the Basel Capital Accord, are
important reference materials for regulators and legislators.
A. Tools Provided by the United States
1. Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal
Reserve Act
Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act are known as
quantitative and qualitative restrictions on banks' transactions with
affiliates.37  To prevent banks from taking excessive risks from a single
affiliate, and thus create risk concentration and risk contagion, Section
23provides:
A member bank and its subsidiaries may engage in a covered
transaction 38 with an affiliate only if (A) in the case of any affiliate, the
37 JONATHAN R. MACEY, GEOFFREY P. MILLER & RICHARD C. CARNELL,
BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 472 (3d ed. 2001).
38 "Covered Transaction" is defimed as a transaction with "an affiliate of a
member bank [including]-
(A) a loan or extension of credit to the affiliate;
(B) a purchase of or an investment in securities issued by the affiliate;
(C) a purchase of assets, including assets subject to an agreement to
repurchase, from the affiliate, except such purchase of real and personal
property as may be specifically exempted by the Board by order or regulation;
(D) the acceptance of securities issued by the affiliate as collateral security
for a loan or extension of credit to any person or company; or
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aggregate amount of covered transactions of the member bank and its
subsidiaries will not exceed 10 per centum of the capital stock and
surplus of the member bank; and (B)in the case of all affiliates, the
aggregate amount of covered transactions of the member bank and its
subsidiaries will not exceed 20 per centum of the capital stock and
surplus of the member bank.39
Given that banks may cause risk contagion by attempting to
benefit their affiliates or help their affiliates improve difficult conditions
through purchasing low quality assets from their affiliates, 23A also
prohibits member banks and their subsidiaries from purchasing "a low-
quality asset40 from an affiliate unless the bank or such subsidiary,
pursuant to an independent credit evaluation, committed itself to
purchase such asset prior to the time such asset was acquired by the
affiliate." 41  Because of the dynamic nature of financial markets, the
types of affiliate transaction vary from time to time. While it is seldom
possible to modify the scope of "covered transactions," the Federal
Reserve Board tends to make the new types of transaction fit into the
enumerated "covered transactions" through interpretation. For example,
checking accounts of parent or non-bank subsidiaries at subsidiary banks
present the probability for overdrafts and so should be regarded as
"extension of credit" to an affiliate by the subsidiary bank. 2
Moreover, Section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act provides that
banks can only deal with their affiliate at arm's length. 43 This section
(E) the issuance of a guarantee, acceptance, or letter of credit, including an
endorsement or standby letter of credit, on behalf of an affiliate". See 12 U.S.C.
§371 c(b)(7).
39 12 U.S.C.A. §371c(a)(1)(A)(B)(West 1981).
40 The term "low quality asset" means an asset that falls into any one or more of
the following categories: (A) an asset classified as "substandard," "doubtful," or
"loss," or treated as "other loans especially mentioned" in the most recent report
of examination or inspection of an affiliate prepared by either a Federal or State
supervisory agency; (B) an asset in a non-accrual status; (C) an asset on which
principal or interest payments are more than thirty days past due; or (D) an asset
whose terms have been renegotiated or compromised due to the deteriorating
financial condition of the obligor. See 12 U.S.C. §371c(b)(A)-(D).
41 12 U.S.C. §371c(a)(3).
42 BHC Supervision Manual, Federal Reserve Board (1999), at Sec. 2020.0.
43 Sec. 23 B (a)(1) provides that a member bank and its subsidiaries may engage
in any of the transactions described in paragraph (2), only - (A) on terms and
under circumstances, including credit standards, that are substantially the same,
or at least as favorable to such bank or its subsidiary, as those prevailing at the
time for comparable transactions with or involving other nonaffiliated
companies, or (B) in the absence of comparable transactions, on terms and
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may effectively prevent a bank from assisting its affiliate to solve
liquidity problems without considering the benefit to itself and the
interest of its customers. Otherwise, losses may occur and risks will be
transferred from the affiliate to the bank. If non-arms-length transactions
are made too often, banks may take on excessive risks and so cause risk
concentration.
Since GLBA was passed, financial subsidiaries of banks have
been permitted to engage in broad types of financial businesses, with the
exception of insurance underwriting. 44 To make 23A and 23 B more
effective in meeting the supervisory needs arising from this change, a
financial subsidiary of a bank is deemed to be an affiliate of the bank.45
Also, to prevent evasions of the Federal Reserve Act and the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act,
any purchase of, or investment in, the securities of a financial
subsidiary of a bank by an affiliate of the bank shall be considered to be
a purchase of or investment in such securities by the bank; and any
extension of credit by an affiliate of a bank to a financial subsidiary of
the bank shall be considered to be an extension of credit by the bank to
the financial subsidiary if the Board determines that such treatment is
necessary or appropriate.46
When inspecting an affiliate transaction in the holding company
system, the Federal Reserve Board requires a list of subsidiary bank
transactions with affiliates and reviews the holding company's policies
and procedures regarding intercompany transactions of subsidiary
banks.47 If the bank's condition is weakened due to the extension of
credit to or the nature of transaction with the affiliate, special attention
will be given.4
While Section 23A and 23B have successfully reduced the
possibility of risk concentration and risk contagion within a financial
conglomerate (especially a "bank parent, nonbank subsidiary" financial
conglomerate), GLBA has left yet another loophole. Because banks in
the United States are prohibited from declaring dividends except under
very limited circumstances, 49 banks are not barred from distributing
under circumstances, including credit standards, that in good faith would be
offered to, or would apply to, nonaffiliated companies. See 12 U.S.C.A. §371c-
I(a)(1)(A)(B).
44 See generally Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, supra note 6.
45 12 U.S.C. §371c(e)(2).
46 12 U.S.C. §371c(e)(4)(A)-(B).
47 BHC Supervision Manual, Federal Reserve Board (1999), at 2020.1.
48 Id.
49 Section 18 (b) of Federal Deposit Insurance Act provides:
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dividends to their parent financial holding companies as long as the
distribution will not lead banks to default. Thus, if a bank "upstreams"
its capital in the form of dividends to its parent holding company, and the
holding company then "downstreams" the money to other nonbank
subsidiaries through loans or other forms of credit extension, the quantity
restriction established by 23A and 23B will be avoided because the
distribution of dividends is not a covered transaction, and the extension
of credit from the holding company to the nonbank subsidiaries is
beyond the coverage of 23A and 23B.
2. Interbank Liabilities
United States federal law imposes restrictions on an insured
depository institution's exposure to another depository institution to limit
the risks posed to insured depository institutions when large depository
institutions falls. 50  The following transactions between depository
institutions may be considered "exposure":
(A) all extensions of credit to the other depository institution,
regardless of name or description, including-- (i) all deposits at the other
depository institution; (ii) all purchases of securities or other assets from
the other depository institution subject to an agreement to repurchase;
and (iii) all guarantees, acceptances, or letters of credit (including
endorsements or standby letters of credit) on behalf of the other
depository institution; (B) all purchases of or investments in securities
issued by the other depository institution; (C) all securities issued by the
other depository institution accepted as collateral for an extension of
credit to any person; and (D) all similar transactions that the Board by
regulation determines to be exposure for purposes of this section.51
No insured depository institution shall pay any dividends on its capital stock or
interest on its capital notes or debentures (if such interest is required to be paid
only out of net profits) or distribute any of its capital assets while it remains in
default in the payment of any assessment due to the Corporation; and any
director or officer of any insured depository institution who participates in the
declaration or payment of any such dividend or interest or in any such
distribution shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both: Provided, That, if such default is due to a
dispute between the insured depository institution and the Corporation over the
amount of such assessment, this subsection shall not apply if the insured
depository institution deposits security satisfactory to the Corporation for
payment upon final determination of the issue.
12 U.S.C. §1828(b).
50 12 U.S.C. §371b-2 (a)(1).
51 12 U.S.C. §371b-2 (c) (1).
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Although this section applies to both the general correspondentf2
and the commonly-controlled correspondent 53 of an insured depository
institution, its utility in mitigating large exposure within financial
conglomerates is significant. The Federal Reserve Board further issued
Regulation F that provided prudential standards for banks to limit the
risk arising from interbank liabilities at the time of the failure of
correspondents. Under Regulation F, a bank is required to "establish and
maintain written policies and procedures to prevent excessive exposure
to any individual correspondent in relation to the condition of the
correspondent."54 Policies and procedures established by a bank to take
into account credit and liquidity risks, including operational risks, in
selecting correspondents and terminating those relationships are also
required. 5 Furthermore,
Where the financial condition of the correspondent and the form
of maturity of the exposure create a significant risk that payments will
not be made in full or in a timely manner, a bank's policies and
procedures shall limit the bank's exposure to the correspondent, either by
the establishment of internal limits or by other means.1
6
Section 371b-2 and Regulation F did enable a bank to create
formal internal procedures to monitor, assess, and manage its exposures
to correspondents within the same financial conglomerate. The only
drawback is that because Section 371b-2 and Regulation F were
promulgated before the GLBA, insurance companies and securities firms
are excluded from the definition of "commonly-controlled
correspondent" because of the prohibition of the affiliation between
banks and insurance and securities businesses. Thus, the expansion of
52 According to the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation F, "correspondent" is
defined as "a U.S. depository institution or a foreign bank, as defined in this
part, to which a bank has exposure, but does not include a commonly controlled
correspondent." See 12 C.F.R. § 206.2(c).
53 According to the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation F, "commonly-
controlled correspondent" is defined as "a correspondent that is commonly
controlled with the bank and for which the bank is subject to liability under
section 5(e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. A correspondent is considered
to be commonly controlled with the bank if: "(1)25 percent or more of any
class of voting securities of the bank and the correspondent are owned, directly
or indirectly, by the same depository institution or company; or (2) Either the
bank or the correspondent owns 25 percent or more of any class of voting
securities of the other." See 12 C.F.R. § 206.2(b).
14 12 C.F.R. § 206.3 (b)(1).
55 12 C.F.R. § 206.3 (b).
56 12 C.F.R. § 206.3 (c).
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the coverage of this act is worth considering to fulfill the supervisory
needs in the post-GLBA era.
3. New York State Insurance Laws and
Regulations
Because the authority of supervising insurance companies
belongs to state insurance regulators, a uniform federal insurance code
does not exist. New York Insurance Law is recognized as the most well-
equipped and sophisticated insurance legislation within the entire United
States; therefore, the following discussion is based on New York
Insurance Law.
With regard to transactions within a holding company system,
Article 15 of New York Insurance Law lists four types of transactions
subject to the prior approval of the New York Insurance Superintendent:
(1) sales, purchases, exchanges, loans or extensions of credit, or
investments, involving more than one-half of one percent but less than
five percent of the insurer's admitted assets at last year-end;
(2) reinsurance treaties or agreements; (3) rendering of services on a
regular or systematic basis; and (4) any material transaction, specified by
regulation, which the superintendent determines may adversely affect the
interests of the insurer's policyholders or shareholders.5 7  Both the
extensions of credit between members of the holding company system
and reinsurance agreements can cause concentration and risk transfer.
The purpose of this section is, indeed, to protect policyholders. The
problems of risk concentration and risk contagion can lead to systematic
risk and shake the stability of the whole insurance holding company
system, ultimately impacting the interests of policy holders and
shareholders. Consequently, the insurance regulator plays the role of
"gatekeeper" to judge whether listed transactions would cause risk
concentration and risk contagion and to decide whether to approve or
58disapprove the transaction.
New York Insurance Law imposes disclosure requirements that
force insurance holding companies to disclose information that may
materially affect the operation of the insurance holding company
57 See NY CLS Ins. § 1505 (d) (2002).
58 According to Section 1505 (d) of N.Y. Insurance Law (2002), "the following
transactions between a domestic controlled insurer and any person in its holding
company system may not be entered into unless the insurer has notified the
superintendent in writing of its intention to enter into any such transaction at
least thirty days prior thereto, or such shorter period as he may permit, and he
has not disapproved it within such period."
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system. 59 In addition, if the regulator has cause to believe that the
operations of a holding company or controlled subsidiaries may
materially affect operations, management, or the financial condition of
any controlled insurer within the system and if the regulator is unable to
obtain relevant information from said controlled insurer, the holding
company and every controlled person within a holding company system
should be subject to examination by order of the regulator 60  The
problems of risk concentration and risk contagion can certainly
materially affect the operation of the insurance holding company system
in such a way that the holding company is duty bound to disclose it and
thus trigger an examination by the regulator. Given that the examination
covers "the holding company and every controlled person within a
holding company system," the examination should be supervised on a
group-wide basis that enables the supervisor to discover the risk
concentration and risk contagion at an early stage.
4. The Glass-Steagall Act
The Glass-Steagall Act used to forbid affiliation between banks
and firms engaged principally in the investment banking business.' This
prohibition was repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.62 However,
some sections of the Glass-Steagall Act containing "flat" unambiguous
prohibitions on securities activities by banks and restrictions on
commercial banking by securities firms are still in force. These sections
may be considered the necessary "firewall" between banks and securities
firms to prevent risk concentration and risk contagion from occurring.
Section 16 addresses the intended separation between commercial banks
and investment banks from the commercial banking perspective.63 It
prohibits national banks from underwriting, selling, or dealing in
securities. 64 Section 21 approaches the problem from the investment
banking perspective by prohibiting investment bankers from offering
checking or savings accounts. 65 Since commercial banking products are
risk-averting products and most investment banking products are risk-
pursuing products, allowing the two businesses to be conducted within a
single firm may lead to serious problems, including risk concentration
59 Ny CLS Ins. § 1504 (a) (2002).
60 NY CLS Ins. § 1504 (d) (2002).
61 See 12 U.S.C. §377 (repealed 2000).
62 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, supra note 6.
63 Macey, supra note 25, at 716.
64 12 U.S.C. §24 (1994).
65 12 U.S.C. §378 (a)(1) (1994).
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and conflict of interest. Thus, the above-mentioned sections should
ideally be retained for an effective regulatory structure.
5. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
In regards to permission for affiliation between banks and
securities firms, and between banks and insurance companies, the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) provides another important feature:
"functional regulation." Prior to the passage of GLBA, financial
institutions were regulated along industry lines.66 Under the functional
regulation system, regulatory authority is allocated on the basis of the
nature of the activity being performed, rather than on the basis of the
institutional identity of the firm conducting the activity. 67 Also, because
of criticism that individual financial institutions are being regulated by
several regulators simultaneously, some of these complex financial
institutions' myriad activities might not receive the appropriate level of
scrutiny. The GLBA charged the Federal Reserve with the regulatory
responsibility of overseeing all financial services organizations from a
68safety and soundness perspective.
Thus, the Federal Reserve Board plays the role of "umbrella"
supervisor, taking the responsibility for consolidated supervision. To
fulfill this responsibility, the Federal Reserve needs to interact closely
and exchange information with the primary bank, thrift, and functional
regulators. Further, the Federal Reserve Board should also foster strong
relationships with senior management and the boards of directors of
financial holding companies (FHC's). To facilitate the function of
umbrella supervision, the Federal Reserve supervisory staff, to the extent
possible, should coordinate their actions with those of the primary bank,
thrift, and functional regulators of the FHC subsidiaries. These
coordinative actions are comprised of periodic information sharing,
reviewing the examination findings of functional regulators, making
available to functional regulators pertinent information regarding the
6 Under this "entity approach," the Comptroller of the Currency regulated
national banks. The Federal Reserve regulated state banks that were members of
the Federal Reserve System and regulated bank holding companies. State
regulators, along with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
regulated state banks that were not Federal Reserve members. The Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the National Association of Securities
Dealers regulated broker-dealer firms. State insurance commissioners regulated
insurance companies.
67 Macey, supra note 25, at 710.
68 id.
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FHC, and reviewing internal-audit and management reports and publicly
available information.
69
In addition, the Federal Reserve Board was granted authority to
examine the financial holding company and functionally regulated
subsidiaries under the following circumstances:
[When] (i) the Board has reasonable cause to believe that such
subsidiary is engaged in activities that pose a material risk to an affiliated
depository institution; (ii) the Board reasonably determines, after
reviewing relevant reports, that examination of the subsidiary is
necessary to adequately inform the Board of the systems; or (iii) based
on reports and other available information, the Board has reasonable
cause to believe that a subsidiary is not in compliance with this Act or
any other Federal law that the Board has specific jurisdiction to enforce
against such subsidiary, including provisions relating to transactions with
an affiliated depository institution, and the Board cannot make such
determination through examination of the affiliated depository institution
or the bank holding company.70
6. Other Sources of U.S. Financial Institution
Regulation
According to the Federal Reserve's Bank Holding Company
Supervision Manual, the Federal Reserve will monitor intra-group
exposures and risk concentrations as follows:
(1) The appropriate primary bank and thrift regulators will
continue to monitor and enforce section 23A and 23B restrictions at the
bank or thrift level. The Federal Reserve will focus on assessing whether
the FHC monitors and ensures compliance with these statutory
requirements. The Federal Reserve plans to begin collecting data from
each depository institution subsidiary of BHC's, including FHC's, on
their covered transactions with affiliates that are subject to section 23A
and 23B and will share that data with primary bank and thrift
regulators.71
(2) Functional regulators will continue to monitor and enforce
any intra-group exposure restrictions that may apply to the regulated
entities under their jurisdictions.72
69 Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual, Federal Reserve Board (2000),
at Sec. 3900.0.4.1.
70 12 U.S.C. § 1844 (c)(2)(B) (2000); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, supra note 6, at
§ 111.




(3) The Federal Reserve will focus on understanding and
monitoring related-party exposures at the group-level, including areas
such as servicing agreements, derivatives exposures, and payments
system exposures, with an important focus on the extent to which a
depository institution subsidiary's risk management is dependant on
transactions with affiliates.73
(4) The Federal Reserve also will focus on management's
effectiveness in monitoring and controlling intra-group exposures and
risk concentrations. The Federal Reserve will consider how an
organization's risk management process measure and manage group-
wide risk concentrations
74
In sum, these guidelines declared four important factors: (1) the
firewall (restrictions on affiliate transactions), (2) the coordination
between the Federal Reserve and functional regulators, (3) the
supervision on a group-wide basis, and (4) the monitoring of financial
conglomerates' self-regulation.
In addition, the United States created the so-called B-O-P-E-C 75
rating system, which is supposed to evaluate the financial condition and
risk characteristics of each major component of the bank holding
company, assess important interrelationships among the companies, and
analyze the strength and significance of key consolidated financial and
operational performances.
76
B. Guidelines from International Organizations
The Tripartite Group of Banks, Securities, and Insurance
Regulators, and the Joint Forum of Financial Conglomerates issued
several reports related to the supervision of financial conglomerates at
the end of 20th century and the beginning of the 21t century.77 The
73 Id.
74"
75 "B-O-P-E-C" is the combination of five factors evaluated in the rating
process--"bank condition," "other subsidiaries," "parents," "earnings
consolidated," and "capital adequacy consolidated."
76 For further details, see the Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual,
Federal Reserve Board (1997), at §4070.
77 These reports are as follows:
(1) Risk Concentration Principles, Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates
(1999).
(2) Intra-Group Transaction and Exposure Principles, Joint Forum on Financial
Conglomerates (1999).
(3) The Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, Tripartite Group of Bank,
Securities and Insurance (1995).
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following discussion extracts excerpts from these reports that relate to
the problems of risk concentration and risk contagion.
The Risk Concentration Principles report reveals that
supervisory strategy with respect to risk concentrations in a
conglomerate necessarily reflects the powers that supervisors have to
induce financial institutions to reduce excessive concentrations and other
dangerous exposures. In all cases, supervisors should have sufficient
authority to gather and safeguard information to monitor material risk
concentrations across sectors and to understand how such risks are
managed. At the sector level, supervisors should review whether they
have sufficient powers to protect the regulated entity from problematic
risk concentrations. When supervisors lack sufficient powers, they
should request any additional authority they need.
78
Given that supervisory concerns emerging from risk
concentrations can be mitigated by good risk management and internal
control policies and supplemented by the holding of adequate capital,
risk concentrations need to be monitored both in the legal entity and
across the different sectors of the conglomerate to provide for the
protection of the regulated entities. Thus, supervisors should take steps,
directly or through regulated entities, to ensure that conglomerates have
adequate risk management processes in place to manage group-wide risk
concentrations. Where necessary, supervisors should consider
appropriate measures, such as reinforcing these processes with
supervisory limits.
79
Owing to the dynamic nature of conglomerate organizations and
the ease with which risk profiles can change, supervisors should monitor
material risk concentrations on a timely basis, as needed, through regular
reporting or by other means to help form a clear understanding of the risk
concentrations of the financial conglomerate,8
0
Additionally, public disclosure of risk concentrations at the
group-wide level can promote market discipline. Effective public
disclosures allow market participants to reward conglomerates that
(4) Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, Joint Forum on Financial
Conglomerates (1999).
(5) Risk Management Practice and Regulatory Capital, Joint Forum on
Financial Conglomerates (2001).
(6) Core Principles: Cross-Sectoral Comparison, Joint Forum on Financial
Conglomerates (2001).
78 Basel Comm. On Banking Supervision: The Joint Forum, Risk Concentration
Principles 9 (Dec. 1999), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs63.pdf.79 1d. at 10.80 Id.
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manage risk effectively and perform sufficient disclosure, and to
penalize those that have poor risk management policies and disclosures,
thus reinforcing the messages provided by the supervisor. For market
discipline to be effective, disclosures need to be timely, reliable,
relevant, and sufficient. Given the complexity and variety of possible
risk concentrations in a financial conglomerate, enhancing disclosures
should include expanding the range of the most important risk
concentrations in periodic financial statements, especially in annual
reports, while making timely and reliable disclosures of exposures
outside the normal reporting cycle as necessary to provide greater detail
in response to market concerns. In short, supervisors should encourage
public disclosure of risk concentrations
l8 1
Risk concentrations may arise from exposures in many parts of a
financial conglomerate. The effective assessment, monitoring, and
control of such concentrations by supervisors is likely to require sectoral
expertise, as well as a good understanding of the techniques used by
other supervisors. Therefore, supervisors should communicate closely
with one another to ascertain each other's concerns and coordinate any
supervisory action relative to risk concentrations within the group8
2
If a financial conglomerate is exposed to risk concentrations that
may affect its financial stability, supervisors should take appropriate
measures with respect to regulated entities. In some cases, supervisors
may elect to take preventive measures. For example, supervisors with the
necessary powers may consider establishing cross-sector limits for risk
concentrations. Exceeding these limits could trigger supervisory
intervention directed at controlling situations affecting the viability of the
regulated entities of the conglomerate. Once a problem arises,
supervisory intervention almost always begins with bringing the issue to
the attention of management and the board of directors and asking them
to address the supervisory concern. While supervisors generally feel they
have the power to seek corrective action by the entity they regulate,
actions elsewhere in the conglomerate may be necessary to effectively
reduce or mitigate the concentration. Where risk concentrations cut
across the regulated entities of the firm, cooperation among the relevant
supervisors (as well as with the primary supervisors) is also important.8 3
Techniques provided by the Tripartite Group and the Joint
Forum to supervise the "risk concentration" and "risk contagion and
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intra-group risk transfer" are similar. Guiding principles outlined above
are also feasible here.
As already mentioned, risk contagion can be the result of a direct
financial connection between a problematic entity and a healthy one. In
the absence of a direct financial connection, risk contagion can result
from the loss of public confidence because financial conglomerates tend
to be recognized as a single economic unit by the public. Regular public
disclosure can inform the public on a timely basis so as to enhance the
public confidence. It has been suggested that one way of counteracting
risk contagion resulting from intra-group exposures would be to establish
a system of firewalls preventing regulated entities within a conglomerate
from helping other entities in the same conglomerate if the provision of
such help would result in the provider being in breach of its capital
requirements. Moreover, the capital standards applied by some securities
regulators are designed to insulate firms and, if necessary, to allow them
to be wound down in an orderly and timely way without loss to
customers and counterparties8 However, these firms are less likely to
fail as a result of a withdrawal of credit lines because their balance sheets
are highly liquid. Moreover, there is no predisposition within a securities
conglomerate to prop up each individual entity. In contrast, many
banking groups are very sensitive to market funding. Experience has
shown that, whenever difficulties arise in one part of a banking
conglomerate, the psychology of the market is such that participants are
quick to withdraw credit lines from (or lower credit lines for) other
entities in the same group. For this reason, banking groups may be
prepared to go to considerable lengths to prevent the failure of any entity
bearing the group's name. 5
As banks, insurance companies and securities firms are different
in their respective core business activities; risks that are dominant in their
businesses are also divergent. Tools of risk assessment and management
are prepared on the basis of the principal risk of the financial institution.
Capital requirements of different financial businesses set up by
regulators are also in accordance with risks borne. In the case of intra-
group risk transfer, transferors typically seek to transfer risks taken on as
a part of their core business activities, while the transferee may not have
adequate capital to bear the transferred risk. Also, the supervisor of the86
transferee may be unfamiliar with the transferred risk. Hence, if the
84 Supra note 13, at 18-19.
85 id.
86 See Basel Comm. On Banking Supervision: The Joint Forum, Risk
Management Practices and Regulatory Capital: Cross-Sectoral Comparison 5
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intra-group risk transfer is not properly monitored, risks of one entity can
spread to the whole conglomerate and then trigger systematic risk. The
Joint Forum recommends that the regulator commence "Cross Sectoral
Comparison''ST to discover the differences in risks, risk management
techniques, and capital requirements, so as to judge whether the
transferred risk can be pertinently managed and backed by adequate
economic capital.
C. Public Disclosure and Market Discipline
As mentioned above, public disclosure plays an important role in
preventing risk concentration and risk contagion. Effective public
disclosure enhances market discipline and allows market participants to
assess a financial conglomerate's capital adequacy and risk profile.
Public disclosure can also provide strong incentives to financial
conglomerates to conduct their business in a safe, sound, and efficient
manner. Public disclosure about the nature, components, and features of
capital provides market participants with important information about
financial institutions' ability to absorb financial losses. This
dissemination is extremely important when an entity of a financial
conglomerate inherits risks from other entities through intragroup
transaction. When innovative, complex, and hybrid capital instruments
are a significant proportion of a financial institution's capital, it is
important that they be adequately disclosed, because the characteristics
of such instruments may have a significant impact on the market's
assessment of the strength and integrity of a bank's capital and of the
whole financial conglomerate's capital.88  Through meaningful
disclosure of its risk exposures, a financial institution's risk profile-that
is, the risks inherent in its on-and off-balance-sheet activities at a point in
time, and its appetite for taking risk-provides information about the
stability of an institution's financial position and the potential of its
earnings to change with market conditions. 89 Given dynamic financial
markets, a financial institution's risk profile can change very quickly.
Therefore, users of financial information need measures of risk that
(Nov. 2000) available at http://www.iosco.org/download/pdf/2001-
Risk ManangementPractices.pdf.
87 Id.
88 See Basel Comm. On Banking Supervision, A New Capital Adequacy
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remain meaningful over time and that accurately reflect sensitivities to
changes in underlying market conditions.
90
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel
Committee) views increased disclosure, enhanced transparency, and
market discipline as becoming ever more important tools of supervision.
In its 2000 report concerning market discipline, the Basel Committee' it
provided several practical guidelines.
First, the Basel Committee recommends that a financial
institution should, at least annually and more frequently where possible
and appropriate, publicly disclose summary information about its capital
structure and the components of its capital, and the terms and conditions
of the main features of capital instruments, especially in the case of
innovative, complex or hybrid capital instruments.92  The Basel
Committee also encourages banks to disclose their structure and process
for allocating economic capital to their business activities.?3 A financial
institution's capital is its buffer against risk. In the case of intra-group
transactions and risk transfer, since each entity usually bears different
kinds of risk, a risk that is adequately backed by transferor's capital may
not be absorbed by transferee's capital. If the capital position and
strategy of an entity does not provide a sufficient buffer against the
transferred risk, this type of intra-group transaction should not be
permitted.
Second, the Basel Committee suggests the following:
A bank should publicly disclose qualitative and
quantitative information about its risk exposures,
including its strategies for managing risk. In discussing
each risk area, an institution should present sufficient
qualitative (e.g., management strategies) and quantitative
information (e.g., stress testing) to enable users to
understand the nature and magnitude of these risk
exposures. Further, comparative information of previous
years' data should be provided to give the financial




91 Supra note 88.
92 Id at 4-5.




Third, the Basel Committee advocates that a bank should
annually and publicly, "disclose its capital ratio and other relevant
information on its capital adequacy on a consolidated basis."95
Sometimes, a large exposure may hide in different parts of financial
conglomerates and may not be discovered by merely looking at the solo
basis data. In reality, a combination of large exposures to the same
counterparty in different parts of a financial conglomerate can be
dangerous to the group as a whole. Thus, monitoring large exposure on a
group-wide basis is necessary. The consolidated information enables
users to assess the gross large exposures that the financial conglomerate
bears.
While public disclosure could facilitate market discipline and
improve market participants' understanding about the risk profiles of
financial conglomerates so as to increase their confidence in the stability
of the healthy financial conglomerate, this function may be somewhat
hampered by the operation of public choice. Benefits that financial
conglomerates can obtain from intra-group transactions or other
activities that may cause risk concentration and contagion are abundant.
Public choice theory indicates that "legislation is supplied to groups or
coalitions that outbid rival seekers of favorable legislation. Every statute
tends to represent compromise because the process of accommodating
conflicts of group interest is one of deliberation and consent.'96 Yet,
there is only limited legislation requiring public disclosure of risk
concentration and risk contagion. This paucity reveals that the interest
groups of financial conglomerates prevail above other groups in the
"bidding." If legislators continue failing to make enforceable laws that
require financial conglomerates to enhance their public disclosure,
supervisors can only encourage financial conglomerates to disclose
related information to the public through unenforceable methods, for
example, ethical persuasion. The effectiveness of these unenforceable
methods is somewhat doubtful.
V. Current Laws and Regulations Concerning the Supervision
of Financial Conglomerates in China and Proposed Reforms
Under the premise of permitting the formation of financial
conglomerates in the future, current laws are significantly deficient in
handling the risk concentration and risk contagion problems and need to
reform on a grand scale. The following discussion focuses only on
9"Id. at6.
96 DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 15-17 (1991).
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existing articles of current laws that may potentially address the
problems of risk concentration and risk contagion even though the
current laws are not specifically designed for the supervision of financial
conglomerates.
A. The Law of Commercial Banks
Commercial banks in China are supervised by the People's Bank
of China. 97 These commercial banks are required to abide by established
ratios between assets and liabilities. One of these ratios is the lending
limit to a single borrower. The Law of Commercial Banks provides that
the "ratio between the balance of the loan of one borrower and the
balance of the capital of the commercial bank must not exceed 10%. "98
Except for this lending limit, no current articles in the Law of
Commercial Banks discuss the capabilities of preventing risk
concentration and contagion within financial conglomerates because
commercial banks are prohibited from investing in nonbank entities and
are not allowed to engage in any securities business.99 Until recently,
legislators have had no need to make laws addressing problems arising
from the formation of financial conglomerates.
B. Law of People's Bank of China
The People's Bank of China (PBC) is the central bank of China,
which takes the responsibility for supervision of commercial banks and
insurance companies.100 It has the power to demand that "banking
institutions submit balance sheets of their assets, statements of profit and
loss, and other financial and accounting reports and materials in
pursuance of regulations."''
C. Securities Law
Securities firms in China are supervised by two regulators: the
securities regulatory body and the state auditing organ. The securities
regulatory body under the State Council is responsible for centralizing
and unifying the supervision and administration of all stock markets in
97 The Law on People's Bank of China, Art. 30 (1995). See also Linbo Fan, The
Insurance Market System, in FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE GREATER CHINA
AREA: MAINLAND CHINA, TAIWAN AND HONG KONG (2000).
98 The Law of Commercial Banks of People's Republic of China, Art. 39(4)
(1995).
99 Id. at Art. 43.
'o The Law on People's Bank of China, Art. 30 (1995); The Insurance Law of
PRC, Art. 70 (1995).
101 Id. at Art. 33 (1995).
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the nation. The state auditing organ supervises by auditing the accounts
of stock exchanges, securities companies, securities registration and
settlement organizations, and securities supervision and administration
organizations. 0 2 The tool provided by the Securities Law to deal with
the risk concentration and risk contagion problem completely isolates the
securities firms, insurance companies, and banks from one another.
Article 6 of the Securities Law provides that securities firms, banks, trust
firms, and insurance agencies shall operate separately and be
administered separately, and securities firms, banks, trust firms, and
insurance agencies shall be established separately.
10 3
D. Insurance Law
The Insurance Law of PRC also prohibits insurance companies
from engaging in other financial business. The fund of the insurance
company may not be used to set up securities operation organizations or
to invest in enterprises.'0 4 Because insurance is a business that accepts
risk transferred from others, Article 99 of the Insurance Law was created
to prevent risk concentration. It provides that the liability for each risk
unit of an insurance company- that is, the liability for the maximum
possible loss caused by each insurance accident-may not exceed 10
percent of the combined total of its actual capital and accumulated fund.
If there is any excess, it shall be reinsured.' °5 This restriction on taking
risk from a single risk unit can still be applicable even after the
permission of the financial conglomerates, as suggested below.
E. Comments and Suggestions for Managing Risk in
Chinese Conglomerates
To address the problem of risk concentration and risk contagion,
the Chinese government should adopt the technique of "risk
avoidance."' 1 6 That means taking every steP necessary to avoid
significantly risky persons, objects, and events. Indeed, completely
prohibiting the formation of financial conglomerates can perfectly avoid
such complex supervisory problems as risk concentration and risk
102 The Securities Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 7 and 9 (1998).
103 The Securities Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 6 (1998).
104 The Insurance Law of the People's Republic of China, Art. 104 (3) (1995).
'
01 Id. at Art.99.
106 "Risk Avoidance" is one of the methods used in risk management. Besides
this method, "Loss Control," "Risk Transfer," and "Risk Combination" are other
methods used in risk management. See SCOTT E. HARRINGTON, RISK
MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 10-11 (1999).
"'Id. at 10.
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contagion. However, as already mentioned, this prohibition can impede
the development of the Chinese financial market and the growth of the
economy. This cost is far greater than the benefits gained from avoiding
the risk concentration and risk contagion problems and is inconsistent
with the first principle of risk management.108 Given that the United
States has successfully established some financial conglomerates while
creating effective mechanisms to tackle risk concentration and risk
contagion, the excuse that the problem is too complicated to supervise is
insufficient and lacks merit. The correct procedure would be to allow the
formation of financial conglomerates and establish a regulatory system to
deal with related, newly generated problems simultaneously.
Modem Chinese laws have a number of deficiencies regarding
the supervision of financial conglomerates. First, they fail to provide a
concrete firewall between banks and their affiliates. Although it sets up
the lending limits to a single borrower, the Commercial Banking Law
ignores other types of transactions between affiliates that can adversely
affect the condition of banks, such as the purchase of low-quality assets.
Moreover, no articles address the issue of arms-length transactions.
Second, Chinese law makes no provision for group-wide level
supervision. The allocation of authority to supervisors is in accordance
with the industry line. Each regulator is only responsible for the entity
he regulates. No coordination policies and procedures have been
established. Besides lacking a so-called "umbrella supervisor" like the
Federal Reserve Board, Chinese financial regulators are nearly unable to
detect and monitor the group-wide risk concentration and risk contagion
problems.
Third, they lack a consolidated financial report and disclosure
requirement. Without a list of transactions that have been done or are in
process of being done, regulators are unable to monitor intra-group
transactions on a timely basis. Thus, needless risk concentration and risk
contagion that can jeopardize safety and soundness are likely to occur.
Fourth, no qualified rating agencies exist in modem China to
estimate the strength of the financial conglomerates. This absence
increases the burden of regulators and leaves consumers uninformed of
the financial and managerial condition of financial conglomerates.




F. How China Can Reform Regulatory and Supervisory
Systems in Accordance with International Standards
and Needs for the Post-WTO Era
As discussed earlier, three types of differently structured
financial conglomerates exist today: the complete integration, the bank
parent and nonbank subsidiaries, and the financial holding company.
The complete integration conglomerate has the advantage of sharing
resources among the various departments engaged in different businesses
with a maximum of flexibility. It can easily achieve both economy of
scale and economy of scope. However, because the risks of the different
financial sectors are most easily spread or transferred from one to
another, the complete integration model has the most serious risk
concentration and contagion problems. 10 9 The bank parent/ nonbank
subsidiary model can strengthen banks through extra dividends paid in
and in fee incomes, and, under the principle of corporate separateness,
the parent bank bears only limited liability for its financial subsidiaries,
maintaining safety and soundness. Nevertheless, risk concentration and
risk contagion can also occur under this model when the bank's
profitability, reputation, and the cost of its funds may be adversely
affected by the failure of any of its subsidiaries." 0 As for the financial
holding company model, legal separateness simplifies regulation and
supervision of the banking activities of the conglomerate, and facilitates
functional regulation of its nonbanking activities. Moreover, the safety
and soundness of the bank can be isolated from the performance of the
nonbank affiliates because the holding company acts as a cushion
between them."' The financial holding company model also best
protects the government deposit insurance funds by limiting the
additional risks permitted to insured depository institutions." 2  The
negative side of this model is that the cost of establishing the holding
company can offset the benefit gained from economy of scale and
economy of scope. Also, the complex structure is more easily
manipulated to avoid the restriction on intra-group transactions.
Obviously, each model has its advantages and disadvantages.
When pursuing higher efficiency and cost saving, the extent of risk
concentration and risk contagion will be collaterally more serious and
vice versa. The financial market in China is an infant market. There,
management's skills in operating a financial conglomerate and the
'
09See id. at § 2.1.2 (1).
110See id. at §2.1.2 (2).
".. See id. at §2.1.2 (3).
112 Wagner, supra note 15, at 391.
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regulating agencies' skills in supervising the financial conglomerate are
still immature. This immaturity begs the question as to whether
supervisors are competent enough at this stage to handle the rapid
development of risk concentration and risk contagion in the completely-
integrated model of the financial conglomerate. Even in a country with
strong financial markets like the U.S., conglomerates did not dare to
venture into the completely-integrated system. In the early stages of
Chinese market liberalization, the financial holding company system is
more feasible. In the case of financial subsidiaries, even though they
may be permitted to engage in a broader range of activities than their
bank parent, the segregation between the bank and the subsidiary must
be clear and absolute in order to prevent risk contagion. When bank
assistance given to the subsidiary weakens the financial condition of the
bank, it should be prohibited and the bank should be required to divest
itself of risky activity.
1. Risk Management Mechanisms Addressing
Risk Concentration and Contagion in
Chinese Conglomerates
To establish a system capable of dealing satisfactorily with risk
concentration and risk contagion in fledgling Chinese financial
conglomerates, the following mechanisms need to be created:
(1) A system of firewalls preventing regulated entities
within a conglomerate from helping other entities in the same
conglomerate if the provision of such help results in the provider being
in breach of its capital requirements and causes unsound banking
practice. Restrictions like those of 23A and 23 B of the Federal Reserve
Act should also be imposed on transactions that can lead to risk
concentration and risk contagion.
(2) Steps taken by supervisors, directly or through regulated
entities, to ensure that conglomerates have adequate risk management
processes in place to manage group-wide risk concentrations. Where
necessary, the supervisors should consider appropriate measures, such as
reinforcing these processes with supervisory limits. Given the dynamic
nature of the activities and structure of financial conglomerates, it is also
essential to ensure that financial conglomerates adjust their risk
management policies and procedures in accordance with their structural
and operational changes.
(3) Laws and regulations that grant supervisors the authority
to monitor material risk concentrations on a timely basis through regular
reporting or by other means that help form a clear understanding of the
risk concentrations of the financial conglomerate. This control should
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include the establishment of a financial conglomerate rating system to
help in providing concrete supervisory information.
(4) A public disclosure system that enables supervisors to
pierce the complex organization of financial conglomerates and to
understand their overall managerial and financial condition. This system
would also provide the public with better understanding of the stability
of financial conglomerates, thus strengthening public confidence. Public
disclosure should at least inform the public about which entities within
the conglomerate are safe and sound, about the segregation of each
entity, and about the limited liability of the holding company. Financial
conglomerates would also be required to provide their risk management
policies and procedures regarding risk concentration and risk contagion,
and to prepare consolidated data.
(5) A coordination system. Specifically, an information-
sharing system that helps supervisors to exchange supervisory
infbrmation, to meet and discuss supervisory problems they have
detected, and to cooperate to handle risk concentration and risk
contagion problems. It would be best for supervisors to have a formal
system for sharing information with each other and even with foreign
financial regulators - for example, in the form of administrative
agreements or treaties - in order to exchange information on a timely
basis.'13
(6) Contact between supervisors and senior management of
financial conglomerates. This contact is especially crucial when
supervisors discover problems through inspection or through sharing
with other supervisors.
2. Treatment of Foreign Competitors
There are five main types of regulatory models concerning the
foreign financial institutions: (1) the "home country regulation,' 4 (2)
the "national treatment,"' 1 5 (3) the "special dispensation," ' 16 (4) the
113 Techniques for building a formal information sharing system are clearly
addressed in The Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, The Joint Forum of
Financial Conglomerates (1999).
14 Home Country Regulation means a country could allow a foreign bank to
conduct business in the host nation under the same terms and conditions as those
that apply to the foreign bank in its home country. See Macey, supra note 36, at
800.
115 National Treatment means foreign banks operating in one country are treated
as if they were domestic banks of that country. Id.
116 Special Dispensation means foreign banks would be given special powers not
enjoyed by domestic banks. Id.
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"special control,""' 7 and (5) "reciprocity."' 8  The current system in
China seems to be the "special control" model.
The special control model is not only inconsistent with the core
spirit of GATS and WTO, but it can also be a distraction to investments
of foreign financial groups. Yet, international standards addressing
problems of risk concentration and risk contagion do exist. If China can
establish mechanisms in accordance with these standards as stated above,
"the national treatment" model can not only better maintain the stability
and soundness of the financial market in China but can also create a
commonly acceptable and nondiscriminatory environment for foreign
competitors. Such a system would resemble the United States' national
treatment system, in which the Federal Reserve may impose restrictions
and requirements on the conduct of activities by foreign banks or
companies comparable to those imposed on a financial holding company
organized under the laws of the United States. These restrictions include
a requirement to conduct activities in compliance with any prudential
safeguards as long as due regard is given to the principle of national
treatment and equality of competitive opportunity. 19 Thus, national
treatment presents the most feasible model.
3. The Structure of Regulators
The supervision of financial conglomerates requires effective,
efficient, accountable, and independent regulators. In economically
developed countries, two major types of regulators exist : the "unified
regulator" (single regulator) and the "separate specialist regulator"
(multiple regulators). The former exists in the United Kingdom' 20 and
117 Special Control means foreign banks would be regulated more than domestic
banks. Id
11 Reciprocity means foreign banks would be allowed to conduct operations in
one country to the same extent that the foreign banks' home country permits the
host country's bank. Id.
19 12 U.S.C. §3106(c) (1999).
120 The Financial Service Authority (FSA) is responsible for the supervision of
deposit takers, the supervision of insurance firms, and the regulation of
investment firms. Recently, it has set up a Major Financial Groups division in
order to take a coherent and integrated approach to supervising these groups. A
major financial group is typically large, operates within a complex structure, is
active in two or more of the main sectors of financial business (banking,
insurance, and investment business), and has extensive international reach.




Japan,12' the latter in the United States. 2 2 Which system is more
effective remains a highly disputed issue.
Advocates of the unified regulator system assert that separate
regulators cannot easily detect group-wide risk, as they only have
jurisdiction over a given portion of a diversified conglomerate. Also, the
unified regulator's arrangements are more flexible than those of separate
specialist regulators. Finally, unification can result in cost savings due to
a shared infrastructure, administration, and support system. Unification
advocates further allege that, (1) the effectiveness of separate regulators
may be impeded by "turf wars" or a desire to "pass the buck,' ' 23 in that
there is likely to be an overlap of supervisory authority, responsibilities,
and skills; (2) different agencies may not share common objectives; 24
and (3) maintaining multiple agencies is not cost-effective.
On the other hand, opponents of a unified regulator system
contend that unified regulators do not strike an appropriate balance
between the different objectives of regulation. Given the diversity of
these objectives, a single regulator may not have a clear understanding of
the various goals and rationales to adequately differentiate between
institutions. Also, a unified regulator may be more inefficient, as it is
usually associated with a monopoly and tends to be quite bureaucratic.
This may eliminate healthy regulatory competition. 12  Lastly, merging
existing agencies or creating a single new agency requires difficult-to-
obtain political agreement among government agencies.126 Advocates
also think that the separate specialist regulator has stronger expertise on
each regulated business and is thus more capable of facilitating healthy
competition between regulators, making it the preferable model.
1
121 The Financial Service Agency of Japan plays almost the same role as FSA in
England. Detailed information available at
http://www.fsa.go.jp/info/infoe/pamphlet e.pdf.
122 Following the promulgation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Federal
Reserve Bank now supervises financial and bank holding companies, and acts as
an "umbrella supervisor." Other financial institutions are regulated by their
functional regulators respectively. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, supra note 6,
at§ 111.
123 Richard K. Abrams & Michael Taylor, Assessing the Case for Unified
Financial Sector Supervision (July 6, 2001) (unpublished conference manuscript
for the Risk Management and Insurance International Conference, 2001,
Taipei).
124 DAVID ScoTr, THE REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF DOMESTIC
FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES 15 (1994).
121 Supra note 124.
126 id.
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With respect to the current allocation of power of Chinese
financial regulators, the People's Bank of China has authority to
supervise both commercial banks and insurance companies. These
actions or powers resemble the unified regulator system. The role of the
securities regulators resembles the separate specialist regulator system.
Since no research clearly indicates that either type of structure is better
than the other, as long as China adjusts the structure of its financial
supervisors in accordance with one of the two types, the weaknesses of
the current system could possibly be eliminated.
VI. Conclusion
The overall benefits of permitting the formation of financial
conglomerates in China outweigh the adverse effects. However, group-
level risk management problems, including risk concentration and risk
contagion, need the attention of both supervisors and financial
conglomerate management. Risk concentration may occur at the group
level and can lead to systematic risk. Risk contagion reflects public
confidence about the stability of the whole financial conglomerate.
Either problem can result in the collapse of the financial conglomerate
and can shake the foundation of the nation's financial market if not
adequately regulated and managed.
As conglomerates evolve, the complexity of risk concentration
and contagion increases. Thus, analytical information demands for risk
management grow. Consolidated supervision and a sharing system
between supervisors and conglomerate management are crucial. It is
also important to ensure that financial conglomerates have a system to
adequately measure, monitor, manage, and control risk concentration and
risk contagion at group-wide level as part of the risk management
program. An independent rating agency should be granted the mission
of evaluating the risk management systems of financial conglomerates.
As has already been proposed, to prevent excessive risk
concentration and risk contagion, it would be prudent to build a firewall
between different entities of a financial conglomerate in order to restrict
the financial connections and prevent financial difficulties occurring in
one entity from affecting another.'27 Although this comment does not
specifically address the debate about the function of the firewall, it is
worth noting that there is much dispute as to how firewalls should be
built Without doubt, its controlling status gives the parent holding
company a responsibility for the risks run by its subsidiary. The holding




company tends to be unwilling to see its subsidiary in trouble because
that can result in the loss of both its investment and its reputation. In
other words, it is in the holding company's interest to rescue its
subsidiary through intra-group transactions. A firewall that is too high
may impede the financial conglomerate's attainment of this benefit and
therefore offset the efficiency of financial conglomerates. The firewall,
although it can reduce risk concentration and risk contagion, is unable to
prevent the subsidiary bank or insurance company of a financial
conglomerate from failing in such a way as to cause the loss of the
governmental deposit insurance fund or insurance guarantee fund. From
this perspective, it might be unwise to bar the holding company from
helping its bank or insurance subsidiary. Thus, balancing the benefits
between the reduction of risk concentration and risk contagion and the
protection of deposit insurance and insurance guarantee fund remains a
task for regulators and legislators.
There is no doubt that public disclosure is necessary to facilitate
market discipline and strengthen public confidence. Yet, this goal seems
difficult to achieve. As already mentioned, financial conglomerates
enjoy large benefits generated from intra-group transactions or other
activities that may cause risk concentration and contagion. Under the
public choice theory, "legislation is supplied to groups or coalitions that
outbid rival seekers of favorable legislation."128 The fact that legislation
requiring public disclosure about risk concentration and risk contagion is
limited to some extent reflects that the interest group of financial
conglomerates prevails over other groups in the process of legislation. If
legislators continually fail to make enforceable laws that require
financial conglomerates to enhance their public disclosure, how can
regulators successfully urge them to improve their public disclosure
through unenforceable ethical persuasion?
At present, the supervisory system of financial conglomerates in
China is virtually nonexistent. Even if its reform in the future brings it in
line with international standards, there will still be no guarantee of its
success in preventing the problems of risk concentration and contagion.
Obviously, no system is perfect. As outlined above, commonly accepted
tools like firewalls and public disclosure have their own challenges.
Nevertheless, a supervisory system that rapidly responds to frequent
changes in the complex structure and variable business of financial
128 Farber & Frickey, Supra note 96, at 15.
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conglomerates, and that effectively implements laws and regulations is
most likely to succeed.
